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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2008, also called the global financial crisis, began on Febru-
ary 2007. At that time, it was unconceivable the idea that some financial institutions fac-
ing liquidity shortages in the US, would be able to damage other economies with such in-
tensity. In the advanced economies, the financial links enabled this disruption to occur.   
The global financial crisis imposed the largest shock in the post-war era. In the 
case of developing economies, they were channelled mainly through international trade. 
For Mexico, these shocks resulted in the worse contraction in exports since 1967 (Figure 
1).  For an economy defined by significant trade openness, having the US as the main 
commercial partner, directly connected Mexico with the turmoil in the US economy.  
 
When compared with previous crises in the recent Mexican history, the crisis of 
2008 was the lighter in terms of GDP growth (Figure 2). Analysing the crises during the 
1980s, the crisis of 1995 and the financial crisis of 2008, it is possible to realize that the 
country has been learning from those experiences, and those learnings has been material-
ized in improvements on governance, political stability and economic performance. 
 
Looking back to the other crises to understand the main limitations of these epi-
sodes. The crises at beginning of 1980s, were sufficient to entitle the whole decade of 80,  
1967; -5,40% 1985; -4,46%
2001; -0,52%
2008; -1,02% 2009; -10,85%
Source: World Bank
Figure 1. Growth of Exports: Products and Services (1961 - 2017)
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Figure 2. Mexican Financial Crises
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as the lost decade crisis. The build-up phase started already in the middle-end of the previ-
ous decade. During the presidential term of 1970-76, the erosion of the fiscal position, 
combined with the 1973 oil shock, boosted capital flight.  
The macroeconomic instability was prolonged until 1980, when the government 
decide to nationalize the private banking system and promote drastic cuts on public ex-
penditure, potentializing the effects of the crisis. After several attempts to devaluate the 
exchange rate and with inflation above 100% (Figure 3), the administration decided to de-
nationalize the banking sector in 1989, privatize some state-owned companies, resulting in 
more investments, economic growth and improvement on macroeconomic stability.    
In the episode of 1995, similar elements to the crises during 1980s are verified. 
The excessive intervention on exchange rates associated to a non-intervention rhetoric un-
dermined the political credibility. In addition, the escalation of the political instability due 
to the murderer of one candidate for presidency, enhanced the risk-premium of bonds.   
At that time, Mexico had joined NAFTA which turn into massive capital inflows. 
The expansionary fiscal policy sustained by short-term bonds with guaranteed repayment 
in US dollars was undermined, by the investors perception of the artificial value of pesos 
compared with US dollars. At that time, the exchange rate was fixed and pegged with the 
US dollar. Mexico defaulted in 1995 and at that time, inflation was above 30% (Figure 3). 
Prior to the period involving the financial crisis of 2008, Mexico matured several 
institutional and policy reforms. For instance, the fiscal responsibility law was consoli-
dated, as well the central bank independence. The exchange rate regime was not anymore 
fixed and since 2001, inflation targeting was the monetary policy regime in place. In the 
Figure 3, it is possible to visualize how inflation scale differs for the three episodes.  
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The official adoption of inflation targeting in the end of 2001, contributed to sig-
nificantly reduce inflation. It rendered the monetary authority more predictable, due to the 
emphasis on communicating in a forward-looking manner. By announcing decisions that 
were going to be taken in advance, the central bank promoted transparency and has the 
possibility to demonstrate commitment in tackling inflation through credible actions.   
These institutional improvements, associated with the accumulation of reserves 
during the years before to the crisis, enabled Mexico, for the first time, to adopt countercy-
clical policies by itself. However, these improvements were not enough, to keep inflation 
within the interval boundaries, especially during the years of 2007 and 2010 (Figure 3). 
The financial stress generated by the crisis, demanded actions of the monetary authority. 
In some cases, as in the US and the UK, the financial stress generated during the 
crisis obligated the monetary authority to shift the monetary policy, loosening it (Martin 
and Milas 2013), (Taylor 2019). However, in the case of developing economies, how the 
main effects were channelled through international trade, the monetary policy is designed 
to respond to different objectives. For instance, while in advanced economies the priority 
was to contain financial stress, in Mexico the objective could be to stimulate employment. 
In this project, the interest is on evaluating the response of the Bank of Mexico, in 
terms of setting the interest rate during the financial crisis. To conduct this evaluation, two 
alternative responses are designed based on the Taylor rule. Each one of the three options; 
the selected response and the two alternatives, are designed to impact unemployment and 
inflation. After measuring their impacts, it will be possible to discriminate which response 
is the most beneficial in terms of inflation and unemployment given the demands of the 
Mexican economy.     
Briefly, as result of the exercise, among the options considered in this study, the 
current response put in place by the Bank of Mexico is the most appropriated. This option 
represents the best stimulus for unemployment in the short-term during the financial crisis.      
The structure of the personal project is the following: Section 2 will briefly review 
the literature. Section 3 will explore the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents and 
discusses results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, three aspects related to the Taylor rule are going to be reviewed: 
First, the elements of the rule. Second, how the Taylor rule can be adapted to reflect spe-
cific characteristics of the economy. Finally, the relationship between the monetary policy 
rule and the financial stress is explored.  
The discussion involving monetary policy-rules gained notoriety after Taylor 
(1992). The mixture involving clear objectives, represented by the targets of the monetary 
policy, in association with the need of greater transparency, founds correspondence with 
the development of the central banking activity. It placed the Taylor rule as a simpler but 
good descriptor of the central bank behaviour, in terms of setting the interest rate.  
From a pure version, three elements are identified. First, the targets. Second, the 
temporal notions and third, the parameters. Within this framework, the targets represent 
the main indicators responsible for guiding the monetary policy actions. In addition, their 
specification shapes the interpretation of the Taylor rule. Some examples are unemploy-
ment and inflation targets. In some cases, they can be replaced by potential values, as in 
the case of potential output.  
In terms of temporal notions, the Taylor rule can include two types: backward and 
forward-looking. The first one, occurs when a central bank react on what happened, and 
the second one, when a central bank reacts considering what is going to happen in the 
economy, demanding them to forecast the state of the economy in order to decide today. 
Previously, the central bank was designed as an institution that included past information 
in its decisions, denoting a kind of persistency (Stock and Watson 2001). 
Finally, the parameters are estimated, and are responsible for amplifying or mini-
mizing the effects generated by the gaps. The gaps are measured by the difference be-
tween observed values and their respective target, or potential value. They are also called 
deviations. Within this framework, parameters are policymaker preferences or trade-offs 
that they are willing to accept, for having a certain interest rate. (Bernanke 2015). 
In the literature, several versions of the Taylor rule are present. The starting ver-
sion is the pure version, and the developments verified in the non-linear and modified   
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versions are departures from this initial version (Castro 2011). Although this variety, the 
Taylor rule can be adapted by adding pertinent elements into the specific rule, reflecting 
particularities of a certain economy. For example: intervention on exchange rates could be 
included, if the government is interventionist. 
This dynamism embodied in the Taylor rule is an advantage, once it allows adjust-
ments to occur more easily. For an economy as the Mexican one, international shocks sig-
nificantly affect the exchange rate (Jayasuriya and Leu 2017). These effects are captured 
by the volatility of the exchange rate and can be reproduced in terms of growth rate.  
During the crisis of 2008, the central bank of Mexico intervened on the exchange 
rate in several occasions. After the establishment of the currency swap lines with the US, 
the Mexican authorities intervened with the objective to stabilize or reduce the cost of the 
US dollar. Also, it was expected that to reduce banking spread, but, the quality of the col-
lateral limited these achievements. (Fleming and Klagge 2010). 
The establishment of current swap lines by the Federal Reserve, were part of a pro-
gram to protect the US dollar. According the financial stress was increasing, the cost of 
US dollars was increasing, and the pressure on US banks as well. Initially, only advanced 
economies were targeted but afterwards some developing economies were also included, 
cases of Brazil and Mexico. As result, the central banks of these economies were responsi-
ble for implementing this policy, enabling to act simultaneously in different economies.   
Lately, it would be verified that part of the spillovers absorbed by the emerging 
market economies were also results of inaccurate actions of central banks in advanced 
economies. These decisions to stimulate the economy by monetary policy, distanced from 
fundamentals, generated excesses of liquidity, enlarging financial imbalances verified later 
in the housing market booms occurred in Spain and in the US. (Taylor, 2019).  
To precise, by fundamentals, is referred to a Taylor rule in its pure form, where is 
included the potential output and the inflation target. In this specific rule, the analysis con-
sists on verifying the distance between the interest rate defined by this specific rule and 
the current interest rate practiced by the central Bank. Lastly, Taylor (2019) realizes that 
institutions in advanced economies acted inaccurately in different phases of the crisis.      
This misbehaviour also contributed to magnify the effects verified in the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. By easing monetary policy, the institutions 
11 
 
potentialized the financial imbalance. In fact, part of the criticism related to the imbal-
ances generated, lies on the role assumed by monetary policy in some advanced econo-
mies. This is consistent with the idea of monetary policy becoming a tool to fulfil other 
objectives, as for stimulating economic growth instead to focus only on price stability 
(Taylor 2019).  
In addition, the shift verified in the monetary policy rule was related with the fi-
nancial stress generated during the during the crisis (Kahn 2010). In most of the advanced 
economies (Drakos and Kouretas 2015), monetary policy rule changed with the increase 
of financial stress, while in the case of the developing economies, this relationship is 
harder to be verified (Çamlıca 2016), (Floro and van Roye (2017).  
In the absence of a directly relationship involving the monetary policy rules and 
the financial stress in Mexico, during the financial crisis, alternative evidences are veri-
fied. Initially, two evidences support the idea that the financial stress was significant. First, 
is how inflation distanced of the target, surpassing the upper boundary. Second, was the 
necessity to accept the currency swap lines. 
In addition to these elements, there are other evidences that reinforce the hypothe-
sis of Mexico suffering with great financial stress during the financial crisis. First, is the 
call for further cooperation by the governor of the Bank of Mexico, between developing 
and advanced economies in order to avoid further spillovers from advanced economies 
(Carstens 2015). Second, is the necessity by the central bank of Mexico to adopt some un-
conventional measures in order to be more incisive in controlling inflation.  
Three examples can be mentioned: First, the Banking and Securities commission 
decision to allow greater flexibility to restructure the portfolios of financial institutions, by 
permitting them to purchase and sale government securities with mutual funds of the same 
financial group for a six-month period (Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia, Cuadra, 2010).   
Second, the Federal Mortgage Corporation, guaranteed 65% of the debt issued by 
non-bank mortgages companies, contributing to reduce the funding costs and enabling, 
these institutions to issue short-term debt without guarantees, restoring the orderly func-
tioning of the commercial paper market.  
As conclusion, is possible to confirm that Mexico also suffered with the financial 
stress generated by the crisis, motivating or not a change on the monetary policy rule. 
 
 
1. The values 1,5 and 1,25 are estimations and standard values from the literature, for instance check Stock and Watson (2001) 
for more details. The dummy variable before the exchange rate growth rate, refers to when the central bank intervenes on it, 
consequently assuming value 1.  
 
2. The interventions are listed on the Bank of Mexico website, and the score 1 is assigned if at least 1 intervention in that spe-
cific month occurred.   
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3. Methodology  
 
3.1. The counterfactuals   
  
The main objective is to assess the decision of the central bank concerning the set-
up of interest rate. In order to perform this task, a counterfactual is elaborated, based on 
Taylor (1992) and described in equation (1). The interpretation of this counterfactual is 
equivalent to an alternative decision, in other words, if the central bank has decided to set 
up the interest rates follow this policy rule, what would look like.     
In this policy-rule, the interest rate reflects the values of inflation and unemploy-
ment, as on Stock and Watson (2001). However, a dummy variable and the growth rate of 
exchange rate also, reflecting the role of exchange rate for a developing economy1.  
 
R(t) =  r
∗ + 1.5(π̅(t) − π
∗) − 1.25(μ̅(t) − μ
∗) + values of R, π, μ +  γ∆𝑠𝑡 + ϵ(t)       (𝟏) 
  
 The error 𝜖(𝑡) can be interpreted as a monetary policy shock, and is represented by: 
 
ϵ(t) =  R(t) − 1.5 π̅(t) + 1.25 μ̅(t) −  γ∆𝑠𝑡 =  constant +  values of R, π, μ              (𝟐) 
  
Respectively, the meaning of the variables, and in the dataset are represented by:  
 
R(t) = Federal Funds Rate (Interest Rate).    
r∗ = Desired Real Rate of Interest (Policy Rate − IR). 
π̅(t) μ̅(t) = Inflation and Unemployment means (Inflation Index and Unemployment Rate). 
π∗, μ∗ = Inflation and Unemployment Targets (Inflation Target and NAIRU).  
γ, ∆𝑠𝑡= Intervention, growth rate of exchange rate (Exchange Rate variation)
2 
 
 The difference between the backward and forward-looking rules lie on the means. 
The specification is similar as well the parameters and variables, but when it comes to the 
means, in the backward-looking (BL) specification, it is included respectively, past values 
of inflation index and unemployment rates. While, in the case of the forward-looking (FL) 
component, the values included in the means are values of periods ahead of the current pe-
riod in evaluation. In both cases, the time-horizon include 12 periods, equivalent to a year.  
  
3. Staiger, D. Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W. (1997) – The NAIRU, Unemployment and Monetary Policy.   
Journal of Economic Perspective. Volume 11, Number 1 - Pages 33-49. Available at: < https://bit.ly/2VQw5vS > 
4. Bernanke, B. S. (2015) – The Taylor Rule: A benchmark for monetary policy?  
Available at: < https://brook.gs/2vZBMxL > Accessed on: 18th April 2019 
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Conceptually, these components refer to which type of information the central 
bank reacts. In other words, having into consideration a certain perspective of the econ-
omy, where the central bank assumes to base its own decisions. In the literature, there are 
several evidences reinforcing the forward-looking component. A justification is related to 
the monetary policy, the decisions take time to reach the economy. Consequently, the de-
cisions of today has to be placed for an economy of tomorrow.   
 About the Taylor rule (Taylor 1992), is the main instrument for assessing the mon-
etary policy rules, remaining as basis for other versions, denominated augmented, modern, 
non-linear among others. Initially, it raised concerns due to the incorporation of the output 
gap and the natural rate of unemployment. 
 Both of them are theoretical variables, and their measurement present substantial 
errors due to the need of forecasting. The presence of noise could lead policymakers to de-
viate from their intended outcomes (Estrella and Mishkin 1998), once an activist policy 
could lead to greater destabilization (Modigliani 1977). The lack of clear rules on how 
forecasts should be done, configures a window for discretion. (Orphanides 2003).3 
 On the other hand, concerning the economic meaning, the inflation and unemploy-
ment gaps included in the Taylor rule, are measures able to capture the credibility of the 
central bank and how heated the economy is4. The parameters before the variables, am-
plify their effects, and the signs, their respective cyclicality. 
In the literature, the common method adopted to estimate the Taylor rule is the 
General Method of Moments (GMM), especially in the optimal monetary policy rule liter-
ature. The GMM allows to capture non-linearities present in the dataset, and represents a 
common standard, while the OLS represents a specific case of GMM. Both are verified.  
As result, the OLS method is preferred when compared with the GMM. The main 
motivation is due to the presence of negative values as estimated values. For an economy 
like the Mexican one, the adoption of negative interest rates would seem implausible even 
when the context of the crisis is considered.   
5. Sims, C. (1982) - Policy analysis with econometric models. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity.  
Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1982/01/1982a_bpea_sims_goldfeld_sachs.pdf>  
Sims, C. (1986) - Are forecasting models usable for Policy Analysis? Quarterly Review.  
Available at: < https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR1011.pdf >   
6. Stock and Watson (2001) - Vector Autoregressions. Journal of Economic Perspectives.  
Available at: < https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.15.4.101> 
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3.2. Testing the counterfactuals  
 
After having decided which method is able to generate the most appropriated coun-
terfactuals, is time to discuss the second part of the methodology, which is responsible for 
assessing the implications of these counterfactuals (BL & FL) and of the factual (IR) on 
the economy.     
To quantify the effects of the counterfactuals, a different method is required. At 
this stage, the interest lies on how they affect unemployment rate and inflation index. To 
support this objective, the SVAR is adopted. The benefit by adopting the SVAR model is 
the requirement of identification. VAR models do not require this step, however without 
it, the basis for analysis would be inexistent5.    
In order to estimate a SVAR (4), differently to the recursive version, an additional 
matrix is required to characterize the contemporaneous relationships among the variables 
in the VAR (5), as shown in the following representation. 
 
  𝐴𝑦𝑡 =  𝐶1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐶𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜀𝑡 ;  𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵𝑢𝑡 (4) 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘 +  𝑒𝑡 (5) 
 
𝐴. is the matrix of contemporaneous restrictions, 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of the structural 
shocks and the shocks are identified by placing direct restrictions on the matrix 𝐴. By 
identifying, it is established a connection between the recursive form and the structural 
form of the model6. In addition, it guarantees the orthogonality of the shocks.  
By imposing the condition of orthogonality, each shock occurs separately. In order 
to implement that, two matrixes are defined, A and B. The form of the matrix A defines 
the recursive structure and the main diagonal in B orthogonalize the effects. The (.) repre-
sents a floating value, allowing variability to occur, representing the short-term restriction. 
𝐴 =  [
1 . .
0 1 .
0 0 1
] , 𝐵 =  [
. 0 0
0 . 0
0 0 .
]
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An important step of SVAR is related to the ordering of the variables. This step is 
conducted with support of the granger test, once it enables to establish the direction of the 
causality and consequently contributes for individuating the best ordering.  
The samples are divided initially, by specification of interest rate: factual (IR), for-
ward-looking (FL) and backward-looking (BL). Afterwards, a second specification is es-
tablished in terms of time-horizon dimension. The initial three samples are subdivided 
based on periods without relation with the financial crisis, and with relation to the finan-
cial crisis, generating two types of samples: Normal period & Financial Crisis. 
Table 1 report all the orderings by sample and specification of interest rate. In the 
appendix, the tests and orderings are further explained.   
Table 1. Ordering of the Variables 
1) Sample: Normal Period  First Second Third 
1) Interest Rate (IR) Inflation Index Unemployment Rate Interest Rate 
2) Backward-Looking (BL) BL Inflation Index Unemployment Rate 
3) Forward-Looking (FL) Unemployment Rate Inflation Index FL 
2) Sample: Financial Crisis     
1) Interest Rate (IR) Inflation Index Unemployment Rate Interest Rate 
2) Backward-Looking (BL) Inflation Index BL Unemployment Rate 
3) Forward-Looking (FL) FL Inflation Index Unemployment Rate 
 
In addition, before to estimate the Impulse Response Function (IRF), all the order-
ings mentioned above were tested to verify their conditions related to stationarity and the 
stability. As result, all the orderings were retained stable, enabling the estimation of IRF 
with consistency.  
Finally, the orderings mentioned previously and described in the Table 1, are esti-
mated by adopting the IRF. The objective in estimating them with this function, consists 
on the need to quantify the impact on variables as unemployment rate and inflation index. 
With the results of this last step, it will be possible to assess the implications of each re-
sponse and evaluate which alternative would suit better for an economy as the Mexican 
one.
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3.3. Data 
 
The dataset contains six variables: interest rate, policy rates, inflation, unemploy-
ment, NAIRU and inflation target. Starting on November 1998 and concluding on Decem-
ber 2016, totalizing 218 observations and configuring a monthly time-series. On Table 2, 
there is a description of the data and the basic statistics are described in the Table 3.   
Table 2. Data Description  
Variable Obs. Begin End Source Empirical variable 
1) Interest Rate (IR) (%) 218 11-1998 12-2016 Banxico 28-day TIIE and TIIP 
2) Policy Rate (%) 218 11-1998 12-2016 BIS Policy Rates (IR) 
3) Inflation Index 218 11-1994 12-2016 INEGI Consumer Price Index 
4) Unemployment Rate (%) 218 11-1998 12-2016 INEGI 
Unemployment Rate 
Women and Men 
5) NAIRU  218 11-1998 12-2016 OCDE NAIRU, adjusted, SA 
6) Inflation Target (%) 218 11-1998 12-2016 Banxico Inflation Target 
7) Exchange Rate Var (%) 218 11-1998 12-2016 FRED 
Mexico/ US Foreign 
Exchange Rate 
 
From the Table 2, there are is an observation concerning interest rate, and inflation 
target. Interest rate is composed by two series: 28-day TIIE 1 and 28-day TIIP (historic se-
ries). The latter started previously in January 1993 and ceased in December 2001, while 
the former starts in January 2002 until the last point of data December 2016. Figure 4 
shows this convergence contained inside of the variable interest rate.  
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The inflation index is calculated following Stock and Watson (2001), the formula 
applied to compose the value is: 𝜋𝑡 = 400ln(𝑃(𝑡) 𝑃(𝑡−1))⁄ , where 𝑃(𝑡) is the consumer 
price index at time (t) and 𝑃(𝑡−1) is the consumer price index at time (t-1). 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Dataset  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1) Interest Rate (%) 8.318303 7.205 5.966043 3.29 36.6 
2) Policy Rate (%) 7.771055 6.585 5.644065 3 35.85 
3) Inflation Index 1.629831 1.65113 1.669195 -2.95966 9.975616 
4) Unemployment Rate (%) 3.818427 3.595 1.130389 2 7.6 
5) NAIRU (%) 3.970836 3.994565 0.518835 3.262295 4.644063 
6) Inflation Target (%) 4.293578 3 2.847273 3 13 
7) Exchange Rate Var (%) .0042379 -0.00377 .0454461 -.0848716 .189642 
 
The inflation target has its observations interpolated, as result the annual value was 
disaggregated equally to all the months of that respective year. The NAIRU was also inter-
polated, with the same purpose, but in that case, it was adopted the linear interpolation.     
 
 With regards to the exchange rate and its variation. The variation is calculated as 
the growth between the compared with the previous year. In the Taylor rule described in 
the previous section, this variation is considered by the dependent variable when is cap-
tured by the dummy variable, indicating an intervention of the Central Bank on exchange 
rate. Finally, the data frequency was daily, by averaging was built the monthly series.    
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3.4. The financial crisis sub-sample  
 
A central point of the current study is the definition of the sub-sample related to the 
financial crisis. This section will discuss two alternatives to define the time-horizon of this 
sub-sample. First, the Federal Reserve timeline is considered and second the GDP growth 
rate of Mexico (Appendix Figure 1 = A. Figure 1).   
Concerning the Federal Reserve timeline, the first event occurred in February 2007 
with the Freddie Mac announcement about subprime mortgages and mortgage-related se-
curities. Finishing in March 2011, with a stress test confirming sufficient capital adequacy 
to start buying back shares, repaying the government capital and paying dividends. This 
timeline is considered once is a very accurate representation of the financial crisis events.  
However, as mentioned previously, there are differences in terms of effects and 
roles assumed by advanced economies and developing economies. In absence of an offi-
cial timeline, the GDP growth rate can represent this proxy variable for transmission ef-
fects. As mentioned previously, developing economies faced two phases during the crisis, 
divided by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.     
Therefore, considering the GDP growth rate of Mexico over the period (Figure 5), 
a difference in the end date emerge. For Mexico, the crisis ended in April 2009 and not in 
March 2011 with the GDP growth rate stabilizing in October 2009.  Confirming the period 
from February 2007 until October 2009, containing 33/218 observations. Table 4 present 
the descriptive statistics of the sub-sample related to the Financial Crisis. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Sub-Sample (Financial Crisis)  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1) Interest Rate (%) 7.428485 7.73 1.195568 4.89 8.74 
2) Policy Rate (%) 6.997273 7.49 1.211302 4.5 8.25 
3) Inflation Index 1.4642 1.55572 1.272408 -1.95614 4.521053 
4) Unemployment Rate (%) 3.037617 2.99358 0.4425375 2.34346 4.19134 
5) NAIRU (%) 4.117496 4.10586 0.1695171 3.860471 4.421051 
6) Inflation Target (%) 3 3 0 3 3 
7) Exchange Rate Var (%) 0.008612 -0.00546 0.057273 -0.08487 0.189642 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Selecting the counterfactuals 
 
As first part of the methodology, the estimation of the counterfactuals was based 
on two methods; GMM and OLS. In the Figure 5 and Figure 6, they are presented and 
compared with the factual interest rate. Both of them are plotted for the period between 
February 2002 (2002m2) until February 2016 (2016m2).  
  
 
From the visual analysis, in the Figure 5, both estimations remained lower when 
compared to the real interest rate. It is possible to observe the non-linearity embodied in 
the method, by reflecting in the graphs of the estimated counterfactuals. Interest rate pre-
sents lower variability and in addition, in several periods the counterfactuals present nega-
tive values. 
Figure 6 presents greater similarity between counterfactuals and interest rate. It is 
observable that their values are intersecting with the variable. Both of them present no 
negative values, and it is possible to observe relationships of leading-lag, reflecting the 
properties embodied in each counterfactual.   
The counterfactuals estimated by the OLS (Figure 6), remain more reliable than the 
counterfactuals estimated with GMM (Figure 5). The main evidence is the presence of 
negative values, not finding correspondence in the economic context analysed. 
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7. In the Appendix, tables A7 and A8 reports the correlation between Interest Rate, Inflation Index, Unemployment Rate, 
Forward-Looking Interest Rate (FL – Interest Rate) and backward-Looking (BL – Interest Rate).  
 
8. The distance between the counterfactual and the factual are calculated by dividing counterfactual by factual. The ag-
gregate distance is calculated by averaging all these distances  
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4.2. Properties of the counterfactuals & the factual  
 
After verifying which method estimated better outcomes, some comparisons with 
the factual are conducted. In figure 7 is compared the ratio between each counterfactual 
with the factual, while in the figure 8 is possible to observe that (BL) presents greater am-
plitude and number of observations above the interest rate. In addition, it presents greater 
average, median and standard deviation when compared with (FL).   
 
In 112/218 observations, the (FL) presents closer values to the factual (IR), while 
(BL) only 106/218. However, when the distance from the factual (IR) is measured, the 
counterfactual (BL) presents a lower average (1,12 vs 1,13), denoting greater approxima-
tion to (IR) than the counterfactual (FL). When this analysis, englobes all the observa-
tions, the result holds, confirming that counterfactual (BL) is the closest to (IR).   
 
In the financial crisis period, the counterfactual (BL) approximated more to the 
factual (IR) in 20/33 occasions. When the distance to the factual (IR) is considered, this 
approximation is intensified, becoming almost equal on aggregate (0.99 vs 0.89).7,8       
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Figure 9. Counterfactuals and Factual
Interest Rate - Backward-Looking Interest Rate - Forward-Looking IR
 
9. IR = Interest Rate, for values check the Appendix Table 17 (A.Table 17) 
For the tables concerning the relative to the estimation, please check the Tables in the section Appendix. 
For the figures concerning the impulse response functions, please check the Figures in the section Appendix    
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4.3. Testing the Counterfactuals  
 
   The impulse response functions (IRF) of the counterfactuals are listed in the sec-
tion 2 of the Appendix (Figures). There, they are split in two columns, where each one re-
fers to one type of sample; Normal period and Financial Crisis, and in each graph shows 
the factual (interest rate - IR) and counterfactuals (BL and FL).  
Analysing the relationship between the factual and counterfactuals as impulses and 
inflation index or unemployment rate as responses, it is possible to observe a considerable 
change in their effects according to the samples. The Table 5 report the results.  
Table 5. Relationship of magnitudes among counterfactuals (n=10) 
Samples:  Normal Period  Financial Crisis 
Variable Inflation I. Unemployment R.  Inflation I. Unemployment R 
1) Mean 1 2 3 3 -1 -2 1 3 -2 -1 3 2 
2) Median 3 1 2 3 -1 -2 1 3 -2 -1 -3 2 
3) Std Dev 1 2 3 2 1 3 2 3 1 1 3 2 
Fac/C.Fac IR FL BL IR FL BL IR FL BL IR FL BL 
Score refers only to the magnitude (1 = Greatest), (3 = Lowest)18. The sign, to the direction of the effect    
Analysing the results, in terms of intensity (Mean), the counterfactuals (FL & BL) 
are responsible for generating unemployment during the financial crisis. While, the factual 
(IR) reduces it. During normal period, is exactly the opposite, the factual (IR) generates 
unemployment while both counterfactuals reduce it. 
When it comes to inflation index, the only option able to reduce it, is the counter-
factual (BL) during the Financial Crisis.  All the other options in both period of times gen-
erate inflation. In the financial crisis sample, this relationship is proportional by the mag-
nitude. While, in normal period, the counterfactuals perform better than the factual (IR).  
In terms of volatility, the less volatile during the financial crisis is the counterfac-
tual (FL) and during normal period is the counterfactual (BL). The factual (IR) and the 
counterfactual (BL) alternates in the first and second options in the financial crisis, ac-
cording to the variable. As conclusion, the only valid response is the factual (IR) once is 
able to reduce unemployment during the financial crisis, stimulating the economy.9   
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4.4. Discussion 
    
In this section, the previous conclusions are further scrutinized. In order to do that, 
the economic context will be included with the objective to refine the quantitative find-
ings, also establishing a connection with the economic context defined by the crisis.  
Initially, the findings from the IRF analysis confirm the Bank of Mexico response 
as the best response among the options considered, during the financial crisis. This is mo-
tivated due to the implications generated in unemployment and inflation. In terms of un-
employment, the factual (IR) is the only alternative that does not intensify unemployment. 
On the contrary it reduces and in terms of inflation, is highest between the periods 2 and 8.  
This initial analysis highlights the trade-off accepted by policymakers during the 
crisis. This trade-off consists on accepting greater degree of inflation in order to reduce 
unemployment. In addition, based on the implications of monetary policy, it is possible to 
affirm that there was a shift in the objectives, emphasizing economic recovery, intended as 
promoting employment, in detriment to price stability.  
Still in the financial crisis, the counterfactuals could be interpreted as weaker ver-
sions of recovery when compared to the factual (IR). If it is assumed that policymakers 
present greater aversion to inflation, the counterfactuals could be considered valid re-
sponses, once these responses are responsible for generating lower inflation compared 
with the factual (IR).  
As consequence, in terms of recovery and here is intended, the alternative that is 
more stimulating to reduce unemployment, it is possible to refer to the factual (IR) as the 
best alternative in this sense, as stated at the beginning. The other two alternatives, the 
counterfactuals (FL, BL) represent weaker stimulus to reduce unemployment, however in 
the case of (BL), this stimulus is still more evident than in the case of (FL). 
  The counterfactual (FL) represents a hybrid option, once it does not reduce unem-
ployment as the alternatives, and is the first option to stabilize around zero. Configuring 
an option that could contribute to prolong the effects of the crisis, lacking countercyclical 
properties, and consequently, discarding this alternative.   
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When it comes to the normal period sample, each option present well defined 
trade-offs. For instance, the factual (IR) is the best alternative to contain inflation, how-
ever on the other hand, face costs in terms of unemployment rate. While, the counterfactu-
als (FL, BL) present similar patterns in terms of inflation index, the counterfactual (FL) is 
more effective in reducing unemployment. 
To further scrutinize these initial interpretations of the possible alternatives, related 
to the financial crisis and to the normal period, the targets for inflation (Inflation Target) 
and unemployment (NAIRU) valued as 4,5% are included in this analysis. They are useful 
to evaluate how distant, the responses generated by each alternative distant form them.   
In the case of the financial crisis, although the factual (IR) present the higher value 
in terms of inflation when compared to the alternatives, this elevated value is still the clos-
est to the target, when compared with the other two alternatives (FL, BL). Reconfirming 
the previous finding.   
In the case of the normal period, the inflation target would support the selection of 
the factual (IR), assuring a behaviour from the policymaker centred in controlling the 
price level. The alternatives (FL, BL) would demand greater tolerance of policymakers 
with the level of inflation, because in order to reduce the level of unemployment, policy-
makers would have to accept higher inflation.  
Considering also the hyperinflationary past of Mexico, explored here through the 
crises during the 80s and the crisis of 1995, the willingness in returning to a similar pattern 
to boost employment sounds implausible. In addition, if at the end, policymakers decided 
to foster employment at the costs of inflation, it could be perceived as a time-incon-
sistency problem, once the central bank, discretionarily would pursue employment.  
As result, it is possible to confirm that the Central Bank of Mexico was assertive 
during the financial crisis and during the normal period, with the conduction of the mone-
tary policy.  
Lastly, regarding the methodology, the initial finding, explored in the section prop-
erties of the counterfactual, diverged during the IRF analysis. In that section, it was found 
that the counterfactual (BL) in aggregate, during the financial crisis, deviates from the fac-
tual (IR) of 1%. Justifying the need of additional methods to further scrutinize an initial 
evidence, and consequently, the methodology applied. 
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5. Conclusion  
    
This analysis explored the role of the monetary policy rules within the Mexican 
context during the financial crisis of 2008. Several methods were applied. Initially, the 
counterfactuals were estimated with OLS. After to quantify their effects on unemployment 
and inflation a SVAR was applied. Finally, an IRF analysis supported the interpretation of 
the results. The dataset is monthly based, starting on 01/1998 and ending on 12/2016. 
The overall finding supports Martin and Milas (2013), Taylor (2019) in terms of 
confirming that the central bank deviated from the Taylor Rule during the financial crisis. 
However, this finding should be further contextualized.  
First, central banks do not mechanically adopt versions of the Taylor Rule, conse-
quently the deviation is expected and normal. The policy rule adopted by the Bank of 
Mexico present similarities with the forward-looking counterfactual estimated.  
Second, the implications for deviating from the Taylor-Rule does not generate ex-
cessive unbalances, as in the case of the UK and US. This is confirmed by the decision of 
the Bank of Mexico in lowering interest rate in the aftermath the Lehman Brothers bank-
ruptcy, and not previously.  
In addition, following the analysis conducted, the factual (IR) represents the best 
stimulus that the Mexican authorities could decide for, at least when compared with the 
counterfactuals (FL, BL). During the crisis, the bank intervened on exchange rates several 
times. These interventions were included in the design of these counterfactuals, by includ-
ing the dummy related to the occurrence of the intervention (1) or not (0), and the varia-
tion of the exchange rate to the initial specification (Stock and Watson, 2001).   
A limitation of the exercise done are grounded in the methods applied and in the 
specification of the Taylor Rule. Changing the specification, would automatically lead to 
different results and by introducing different variables into the structural vector auto-
regressive models. Remaining future possibilities for future research.   
Other window for future research concerns the relationship between inflation and 
interest rate decision, inflation and GDP growth. By assessing this relationship, would be 
possible to corroborate or not, if the decision was sufficient to readdress economic growth.     
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Appendix  
 
1. Tables  
 
A. Table 1. Pair-wise correlation matrix (Dataset) 
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
1) Interest Rate (%) 1       
2) Policy Rate (%) 0.9942 1      
3) Inflation Index 0.5569 0.5698 1     
4) Unemployment Rate (%) -0.1088 -0.1374 -0.0691 1    
5) NAIRU (%) -0.6286 -0.6199 -0.2471 -0.0897 1   
6) Inflation Target (%) 0.8946 0.8859 0.474 0.0697 -0.5484 1  
7) Exchange Rate Var (%) -0.039 -0.0312 -0.0168 -0.0189 0.0367 -0.0508 1 
 
 
A. Table 2. Shock Estimation (ε) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                    
BIC                             .               .           885.9          1179.9   
dfres                                                         176             176   
R-sqr                                                       0.091           0.056   
                                                                                    
                           (1.61)          (3.34)                                   
constant                    5.619***       29.030***                                
b3                                                                                  
                                                                                    
                           (0.26)          (0.59)                                   
constant                   -0.712**         0.826                                   
b2                                                                                  
                                                                                    
                           (0.62)          (1.31)          (1.62)          (3.37)   
constant                    1.399*         -3.949**         5.619***       29.030***
                                                                           (0.59)   
FL - Unemployment ~e                                                        0.826   
                                                                           (1.33)   
FL - Inflation Index                                                       -3.949** 
                                                           (0.26)                   
BL - Unemployment ~e                                       -0.712**                 
                                                           (0.63)                   
BL - Inflation Index                                        1.399*                  
main                                                                                
                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                           GMM BL          GMM FL          OLS BL          OLS FL   
                                                                                    
30 
 
A. Table 3. The counterfactual (Interest Rate estimation) 
 
A. Table 4. Counterfactual properties  
Measure / Counterfactual (BL) - Interest Rate (FL) - Interest Rate  
1) Median 7.0946755 7.031476 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                    
BIC                             .               .           932.8           996.1   
dfres                                                         212             212   
R-sqr                                                       0.965           0.953   
                                                                                    
                           (0.77)          (0.98)                                   
constant                    2.966***       10.220***                                
b4                                                                                  
                                                                                    
                           (0.82)          (1.00)                                   
constant                    0.245          -6.449***                                
b3                                                                                  
                                                                                    
                           (0.33)          (0.55)                                   
constant                    0.652*          4.423***                                
b2                                                                                  
                                                                                    
                           (0.65)          (0.60)                                   
constant                   -3.131***       -8.193***                                
                                                                           (0.07)   
Fitted values                                                               0.367***
                                                                           (0.19)   
FL - Unemployment ~e                                                        0.197   
                                                                           (0.68)   
FL - Inflation Index                                                        1.391*  
                                                                           (0.31)   
Taylor Rule - Unem~L                                                       -1.534***
                                                                           (0.08)   
Taylor Rule - Infl~L                                                       -0.986***
                                                           (0.32)                   
Fitted values                                               3.229***                
                                                           (2.69)          (3.21)   
Intervention on Ex~e                                        0.468           1.811   
                                                           (0.24)                   
BL - Unemployment ~e                                        1.695***                
                                                           (1.13)                   
BL - Inflation Index                                       -4.600***                
                                                           (0.24)                   
Taylor Rule - Unem~L                                       -2.665***                
                                                           (0.11)                   
Taylor Rule - Infl~L                                       -0.218*                  
main                                                                                
                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                        IR-GMM-BL       IR-GMM-FL       IR-OLS-BL       IR-OLS-FL   
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2) Mean 7.074883132 6.780547621 
3) Standard Deviation 1.661113489 1.0178738 
4) Variance 2.759298022 1.036067072 
 
A. Table 5. Pair-wise correlation matrix (Sub-sample: Normal Period) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1) Interest Rate (%) 1     
2) Inflation Index 0.5748 1    
3) Unemployment Rate -0.1272 -0.0942 1   
4) (BL) - Interest Rate (%) 0.95 0.506 -0.1474 1  
5) (FL) - Interest Rate (%) 0.9327 0.5156 -0.1025 0.9752 1 
 
A. Table 6. Pair-wise correlation matrix (Sub-sample: Financial Crisis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1) Interest Rate (%) 1     
2) Inflation Index 0.3475 1    
3) Unemployment Rate -0.6659 0.0818 1   
4) (BL) - Interest Rate (%) 0.2308 -0.0736 -0.3727 1  
5) (FL) - Interest Rate (%) 0.5713 0.0098 -0.5032 -0.3705 1 
The Backward-Looking Interest Rate as well the Forward-Looking Interest Rate referred to the variables estimated with the OLS and 
selected as counterfactuals.  
 
32 
  
 
A. Table 7. Impulse Response Functions Analyses 
 II (NP) UR (NP) II (FC) 
 IR FL BL IR FL BL IR FL BL 
1) Mean 
0.047 0.057 0.061 0.030 -0.147 -0.086 0.053 0.009 -0.040 
2) Median  
0.048 0.057 0.049 0.036 -0.155 -0.079 0.066 0.003 -0.065 
3) St. Dev  
0.063 0.087 0.097 0.035 0.040 0.021 0.059 0.056 0.080 
 
Continuation A. Table 7 
UR (FC) IR FL BL  Legend A. Table 7 
1) Mean -0.051 0.001 0.008  II – Inflation Index 
2) Median  -0.053 -0.002 0.014  UR – Unemployment Rate 
3) St. Dev  0.012 0.018 0.013  NP – Normal Period, FC – Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
  
A. Table 8. Pair-wise granger causality test 
 
1. Normal Period  
a. Interest Rate – Ordering (Inflation Index – Unemployment Rate – Interest Rate) 
 
b. Forward-Looking Counterfactual – Ordering (Unemployment Rate – Inflation Index – FL) 
 
c. Backward-Looking Counterfactual – Ordering (BL – Inflation Index- Unemployment Rate) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
        interest_rate                ALL    29.073    14    0.010     
        interest_rate          unem_rate    19.297     7    0.007     
        interest_rate          cpi_index    13.227     7    0.067     
                                                                      
            unem_rate                ALL    31.025    14    0.005     
            unem_rate      interest_rate     15.38     7    0.031     
            unem_rate          cpi_index    21.457     7    0.003     
                                                                      
            cpi_index                ALL     97.61    14    0.000     
            cpi_index      interest_rate    44.052     7    0.000     
            cpi_index          unem_rate    40.814     7    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
                                                                      
            IR_OLS_FL                ALL    35.083    14    0.001     
            IR_OLS_FL          cpi_index    9.9947     7    0.189     
            IR_OLS_FL          unem_rate    16.868     7    0.018     
                                                                      
            cpi_index                ALL    115.03    14    0.000     
            cpi_index          IR_OLS_FL    58.087     7    0.000     
            cpi_index          unem_rate     40.24     7    0.000     
                                                                      
            unem_rate                ALL    46.876    14    0.000     
            unem_rate          IR_OLS_FL    30.045     7    0.000     
            unem_rate          cpi_index    16.641     7    0.020     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
                                                                      
            unem_rate                ALL    19.935    14    0.132     
            unem_rate          cpi_index    14.159     7    0.048     
            unem_rate          IR_OLS_BL    5.1203     7    0.645     
                                                                      
            cpi_index                ALL    122.26    14    0.000     
            cpi_index          unem_rate    42.993     7    0.000     
            cpi_index          IR_OLS_BL     63.91     7    0.000     
                                                                      
            IR_OLS_BL                ALL    89.697    14    0.000     
            IR_OLS_BL          unem_rate    23.706     7    0.001     
            IR_OLS_BL          cpi_index    72.102     7    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
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2. Financial Crisis  
a. Interest Rate – Ordering (Inflation Index – Unemployment Rate – Interest Rate) 
 
b. Forward-Looking Counterfactual – Ordering (FL – Inflation Index - Unemployment Rate) 
 
c. Backward-Looking Counterfactual – Ordering (Inflation Index – BL - Unemployment Rate) 
                                                                      
     ln_interest_rate                ALL    1.9987     4    0.736     
     ln_interest_rate       ln_unem_rate    .50241     2    0.778     
     ln_interest_rate       ln_cpi_index    1.3177     2    0.517     
                                                                      
         ln_unem_rate                ALL     20.43     4    0.000     
         ln_unem_rate   ln_interest_rate    15.296     2    0.000     
         ln_unem_rate       ln_cpi_index     4.113     2    0.128     
                                                                      
         ln_cpi_index                ALL    14.246     4    0.007     
         ln_cpi_index   ln_interest_rate    5.1802     2    0.075     
         ln_cpi_index       ln_unem_rate    10.722     2    0.005     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
                                                                      
      L3_ln_unem_rate                ALL    3.2141     4    0.523     
      L3_ln_unem_rate    L3.ln_cpi_index    .73676     2    0.692     
      L3_ln_unem_rate       ln_IR_OLS_FL    2.5052     2    0.286     
                                                                      
      L3_ln_cpi_index                ALL    13.876     4    0.008     
      L3_ln_cpi_index    L3.ln_unem_rate    12.268     2    0.002     
      L3_ln_cpi_index       ln_IR_OLS_FL    3.2288     2    0.199     
                                                                      
         ln_IR_OLS_FL                ALL    8.9862     4    0.061     
         ln_IR_OLS_FL    L3.ln_unem_rate    3.8438     2    0.146     
         ln_IR_OLS_FL    L3.ln_cpi_index    5.2634     2    0.072     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
                                                                      
         ln_unem_rate                ALL    3.4209     4    0.490     
         ln_unem_rate    L2.ln_IR_OLS_BL    .29781     2    0.862     
         ln_unem_rate       ln_cpi_index     3.212     2    0.201     
                                                                      
      L2_ln_IR_OLS_BL                ALL    7.8667     4    0.097     
      L2_ln_IR_OLS_BL       ln_unem_rate    6.2053     2    0.045     
      L2_ln_IR_OLS_BL       ln_cpi_index    .60793     2    0.738     
                                                                      
         ln_cpi_index                ALL    21.796     4    0.000     
         ln_cpi_index       ln_unem_rate    11.065     2    0.004     
         ln_cpi_index    L2.ln_IR_OLS_BL    10.893     2    0.004     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
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. 
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .1447037                   .144704    
      .4959776 -  .2588896i       .55948    
      .4959776 +  .2588896i       .55948    
      .1130296 -   .656668i      .666325    
      .1130296 +   .656668i      .666325    
      -.593105 -  .4181798i      .725705    
      -.593105 +  .4181798i      .725705    
     -.7132666 -  .4271395i      .831383    
     -.7132666 +  .4271395i      .831383    
     .05685446 -  .8477145i      .849619    
     .05685446 +  .8477145i      .849619    
      .8919649                   .891965    
     -.8957258                   .895726    
      .8985337                   .898534    
      .4374019 -  .7961261i      .908371    
      .4374019 +  .7961261i      .908371    
     -.4480448 -  .7997203i      .916677    
     -.4480448 +  .7997203i      .916677    
      .8067375 -  .4850043i      .941305    
      .8067375 +  .4850043i      .941305    
       .963603                   .963603    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
    -.01987061                   .019871    
      .5688747 -  .3228084i      .654082    
      .5688747 +  .3228084i      .654082    
      .1179265 -  .6461716i      .656844    
      .1179265 +  .6461716i      .656844    
     -.6006697 -  .3798636i      .710704    
     -.6006697 +  .3798636i      .710704    
      .7718211                   .771821    
     -.7233668 -  .4146418i      .833779    
     -.7233668 +  .4146418i      .833779    
     .04225043 -  .8606303i      .861667    
     .04225043 +  .8606303i      .861667    
     -.8788755                   .878876    
     -.4432086 -   .799681i      .914289    
     -.4432086 +   .799681i      .914289    
      .4263001 -   .816455i      .921049    
      .4263001 +   .816455i      .921049    
      .8137334 -  .4966724i      .953334    
      .8137334 +  .4966724i      .953334    
      .9572724 - .00600487i      .957291    
      .9572724 + .00600487i      .957291    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
. 
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .1708662                   .170866    
     -.5123438 -  .2339565i      .563233    
     -.5123438 +  .2339565i      .563233    
      .1279028 -  .5881647i      .601911    
      .1279028 +  .5881647i      .601911    
      .5402493 -  .4074905i      .676696    
      .5402493 +  .4074905i      .676696    
     -.8319302                    .83193    
     -.7157161 -  .4609975i      .851333    
     -.7157161 +  .4609975i      .851333    
     .03125014 -  .8863031i      .886854    
     .03125014 +  .8863031i      .886854    
      .4270362 -   .793972i      .901527    
      .4270362 +   .793972i      .901527    
     -.4430954 -  .7897667i      .905574    
     -.4430954 +  .7897667i      .905574    
        .90959 - .03697224i      .910341    
        .90959 + .03697224i      .910341    
      .9522447                   .952245    
      .8237173 -   .487699i      .957267    
      .8237173 +   .487699i      .957267    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .5591376                   .559138    
     .06198794 -  .6610262i      .663926    
     .06198794 +  .6610262i      .663926    
     -.7535273                   .753527    
      .9693148 -  .2260875i      .995333    
      .9693148 +  .2260875i      .995333    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .0806035                   .080603    
     -.4425547                   .442555    
      .6206006                   .620601    
      .2750454 -  .6071109i      .666509    
      .2750454 +  .6071109i      .666509    
      .9869521                   .986952    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .4056965                   .405697    
      .1924377 -  .5186344i      .553185    
      .1924377 +  .5186344i      .553185    
     -.6693716                   .669372    
      .8868839 -  .2607292i      .924415    
      .8868839 +  .2607292i      .924415    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   Eigenvalue stability condition
A. Table 9. Eigenvalue Stability Condition.  
 
1. Normal Period  
 
a. Interest Rate        b.   Forward-Looking      c.   Backward-Looking 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Financial Crisis  
 
a. Interest Rate        b.   Forward-Looking      c.   Backward-Looking 
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2. Figures  
 
A. Figure 1. GDP Growth Rate: Mexico & US  
 
 
 
 
A. Figure 2. Histogram: Sub-Samples: Normal Period & Financial Crisis 
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A. Figure 3. Impulse Response Function: SVAR 
a.  Sample: Normal Period b. Sample: Financial Crisis 
Period: January 2001 – January 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Period: February 2007 – October 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
